published, and registered mail -are inadequate.
xi Requirements for service of process have been relaxed concurrently with a trend towards increasing mobility. The criticism that may hold the most weight is that the adoption of electronic service of process removes formality from the procedure-formality that may give weight to the documents and the legal proceedings in the eyes of the defendant. This reason may have been the reason that, in the process of amending service of process to incorporate mail service, the Rules were instead amended to create the option of waiver; Rule 4(d) allows defendants to avoid the cost of personal service by waiving service, the process of which uses mail to send and return the judicial documents. xliii The rule provides that a plaintiff can notify the defendant of the commencement of the action and request the defendant waive formal service. But on its face, it is illogical that with waiver, the FRCP allows defendants who are actually notified of the commencement of legal proceedings through receipt of a waiver notification to refuse waiver for personal service. In short, why do the Federal Rules allow a defendant who has notice of proceedings against her to demand formal service? The answer is best attributed to the compliance pull that arises from the increased legitimacy that comes from the formality in personal service of process.
The adoption of electronic service of process would supersede the function of waiver and eliminate the use of the provision-but it is nonetheless the better choice in light of its numerous benefits and the future capacity to build electronically based legitimizing characteristics that can exert a similar compliance pull;
there is an open-ended future potential for the creation of electronically based legitimizing features that can exert a compliance pull.
Adoption Proposal
It might seem service of process would best be streamlined such that domestic and international service of process procedure were the same. However, it is difficult to capture domestic and international concerns within the same language because FRCP 4(f)(3), which allows service of process "by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders," displays the intention to make international accommodations of the laws of other nations-a comity concern that is not relevant in domestic service of process.
We could amend the FRCP to incorporate electronic service of process domestically by looking to federal rules in other nations. A modification of the Federal Rules would have an immediate impact on all federal courts, and thus, effectuate new procedure in the entire nation.
The benefit of a blanket application of the service amendments to the federal system is that it could perhaps spur state legislatures to follow suit with amendments to their own civil procedure rules. The disadvantage, of course, is that implementation of electronic service of process in all federal courts through the FRCP rather than on a state-by-state basis results in forfeiture of the "laboratory of the states" benefit that could come from gradual implementation. Of course, I
would espouse adoption on both the state and federal level, but this proposal addresses an amendment to the FRCP as a starting template.
One source that provides a potential model is Australia. Leigh, the Federal Magistrates Court in Australia pursuant to Rule 10.24 ordered that the plaintiff may notify the defendant of the pendency of proceedings against him through text message.
xlvii As a rough proposal, Federal Rule 4(e) could be amended with several provisions to address domestic electronic service of process.
The amendment could include a safeguard requirement that the online address is actually used by the defendant, which would provide that the plaintiff must make an affirmative showing that the defendant has accessed the electronic profile/platform/communication device previously within a certain number of days. This construction would import the "reasonably calculated" flexible standard articulated in Mullane xlviii and would give a court the discretion to interpret whether a given technological communication mechanism in a given case is a constitutional method for service of process. Additionally, this safeguard along with adopting a model similar to Australia's would be consistent with the requirement within Mullane that the means employed to effect service be one in which a person desiring to contact the defendant would use. 
